Public blockchains such as Ethereum and Bitcoin do not give enterprises the privacy they need for their business processes. Consequently consortiums are exploring private blockchains to keep their membership and transactions private. Ethereum Private Sidechains is a private blockchain technology which allows many blockchains to be operated in parallel. Communication is needed between Ethereum Private Sidechains to allow a function in a contract on one sidechain to execute function calls which return values from, or update the state of, another sidechain. We propose a crosschain technique which allows transactions to be executed atomically across sidechains, introduce a new mechanism for proving values across sidechains, describe a transaction locking mechanism which works in the context of blockchain to enable atomic transactions, and a methodology for providing a global time-out across sidechains. We outline the programming model to be used with this technology and provide as an example, a variable amount atomic swap contract for exchanging value between sidechains. Although this paper presents Atomic Crosschain Transaction technology in the context of Ethereum Private Sidechains, we discuss how this technology can be readily applied to many blockchain systems to provide cross-blockchain transactions.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we focus on Atomic Crosschain Transactions for Ethereum Private Sidechains [1] . Atomic Crosschain Transactions are motivated by two requirements common in other distributed systems: data and functionality we wish to use may be available in other systems. The first requirement, accessing data in other systems, has been previously explored by distributed query languages, for example SPARQL Federated Query 1.1 [2] and the Resource Description Framework 1.1 [3] . The second requirement, accessing functionality in other systems, has been common for decades via Remote Procedure Calls (RPC) [4] .
Sidechains are blockchains which rely on a separate blockchain for their overall utility, such as enhanced security by pinning to the blockchain [5] , for addressing information [6] , or for storing data which is used across all sidechains. We use blockchains as a shared data store for all sidechains participating in Atomic Crosschain Transactions.
Ethereum Private Sidechains [1] are ephemeral, on-demand, private, permissioned sidechains which provide confidentiality.
Only the privacy and permissioning aspects of the technology are relevant to this paper. Privacy relates to keeping the identity of sidechain participants secret. Permissioning relates to restricting which nodes can connect to a sidechain and which Ethereum Accounts can be used with the sidechain.
Ethereum Transactions update the state of the distributed ledger of an Ethereum blockchain but can not return a value. Ethereum Views return values but can not update the state. In this paper we describe Crosschain Transactions that allow reading and writing across sidechains by combining Ethereum Transactions and Views in the following way: A Crosschain Transaction consists of an Originating Transaction and one or more Subordinate Transactions and Subordinate Views, where the Originating Transaction is the Ethereum Transaction which executes on the sidechain on which the Crosschain Transaction was submitted, and the Subordinate Transactions and Subordinate Views are Ethereum Transactions and Ethereum Views which execute on other sidechains as a result of the Originating Transaction.
Reed [7] defines Atomic Actions as ...a program-specified computation that, although composed of primitive computational steps executed at different times and in different places, cannot be decomposed from the point of view of computations outside the atomic action. During the execution of atomic actions, intermediate states of data objects that arise will never be observed by computations outside the atomic action. In the context of Crosschain Transactions, atomic means that the Originating Transaction and all Subordinate Transactions are either all accepted or all ignored. Enquiries as to the state of the distributed ledger on any sidechain after the Crosschain Transaction has started and before it has ended will yield a consistent value. Depending on the context of the read, the value returned will be the value prior to the start of the transaction, the value assuming the transaction is committed, or the read will fail.
A key consideration which previous distributed systems approaches did not need to overcome is consensus. Blockchain systems require validator nodes to agree on the transactions to be added to the blockchain using a consensus algorithm. Once the blocks are added to the blockchain, the updates are final. To deliver atomic behaviour across sidechains, we propose that updates once added to blockchains be considered provisional.
The provisional updates need to be unrevocable. Once certain conditions occur, the updates need to be either committed or ignored.
An example Crosschain Transaction consisting of an Originating Transaction, a Subordinate View and a Subordinate Transaction is shown in Figure 1 . The application submits the Originating Transaction to Sidechain 1 which causes the function condBuy in the Control contract to execute. An Ethereum View call is dispatched to the rate function in the Oracle contract on Sidechain 2. The value returned by the rate function is used in the condBuy function. If the value is below 100, then an Ethereum Transaction is dispatched to the Commodity contract on Sidechain 3. The buy function updates the state of the Commodity contract.
A more complex example could have multiple levels of Subordinate Transactions being submitted to different sidechains as a result of the Originating Transaction. Under the Originating Transaction and each Subordinate Transaction there could be multiple levels of Subordinate Views, calling out to different sidechains. The Subordinate Transactions and Subordinate Views that are issued are dependant on the call graph starting from the Originating Transaction.
We organised the paper as follows: in the Background section we describe the concept of private blockchains and the enterprise version of Ethereum, explain the importance of having finality for blocks so that they can be added to the blockchain, describe some key research related to distributed systems and two phase commits, and then explain threshold signature schemes. The next section, Related Works, reviews alternative existing techniques for crosschain transactions, showing that they are not appropriate for atomic function calls across blockchains, and reviews existing work on blockchain locking. Thereafter, the proposed approach to Crosschain function calls is described in detail in the Approach section, by first introducing the protocol components, then describing how Subordinate Views and Subordinate Transactions are processed, and finally describing the overall Crosschain Transaction and Crosschain View processing approaches. The Programming Model to be used with the approach is described, including an example demonstrating how to use the approach to provide an atomic swap for partial amounts of Ether between sidechains. How the approach and programming model could fail are then analysed in two sections. Failure Cases Handled Within Protocol explains how the protocol handles system failures and attacks. Failure Cases Handled by Application describes failure situations which should be prevented by the application. The paper concludes with a discussion of how the approach could be applied to other blockchain systems to provide atomic cross-blockchain transactions.
This paper introduces what we believe is the first methodology for processing atomic transactions which include function calls across consortium sidechains. It describes how a threshold signature scheme can be used for proving values agreed on one sidechain to another sidechain. It introduces a method of parameter passing between sidechains which links the function doing the call in one sidechain to the function being called in another sidechain. It describes an atomic transaction locking mechanism which works in the context of blockchain. It introduces the idea of using a coordination blockchain as a global time-out, thus removing the requirement for crosschain time-out synchronisation. It introduces a crosschain transaction format and explains the methodology for processing the transactions within an Ethereum Virtual Machine. This paper contributes the concept of a Multichain Node. Multichain Nodes contain a set of trusted sidechain nodes all of which are on different sidechains, but work together. This paper introduces the programming model to be used for Crosschain Transactions.
II. BACKGROUND A. Ethereum
Ethereum [8] is a blockchain platform which allows users to upload and execute computer programs known as Smart Contracts. Ethereum Smart Contracts can be written in a variety of Turing complete languages, the most popular being Solidity [9] . Code is compiled into a bytecode representation. The bytecode can then be deployed using a contract creation transaction. Contracts have a special constructor function which only runs when the contract creation transaction is being processed. This function is used to initialize memory and call other contract code. Miners execute the bytecode inside the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). At present, each miner must execute all transactions for all contracts and hold the current value of all the memory associated with all of the contracts. The Ethereum community is actively working on methodologies to scale the Ethereum network by sharding the blockchain [10] .
Ethereum transactions update the state of the distributed ledger but do not return values. They fall into three categories: Ether transfer, contract creation, and calling a function on a contract. Ether transfer transactions move Ether from the user's account to another account. Contract creation transactions put code into the distributed ledger and call the constructor of the contract code, setting the contract data's initial state. Function call transactions call a function on a contract and result in updated state. Contract creation and function call transactions also allow Ether to be transferred. All types of transactions must be signed by a private key corresponding to an account and include a nonce value which prevents replay attacks. In addition to Ethereum transactions, "View" function calls can be executed on the Smart Contract code. These View function calls return a value and do not update the state of the Smart Contract.
Precompiled Contracts are code which is accessible to Smart Contracts within the EVM at certain well-known contract addresses. Precompiled Contracts are implemented as part of the Ethereum Client in the Ethereum Client's own language. In the case of Pantheon Ethereum Client [11] , they are written in Java. Precompiled Contracts allow complex extensions to be added to Ethereum which would either take very long to execute or require resources outside of the EVM. As Precompiled Contracts are called from traditional Smart Contracts, to allow all nodes of an Ethereum network to execute all transactions, all of the nodes need to be instances of Ethereum Client software which supports the same set of Precompiled Contracts.
Executing code and accessing resources, such as memory, costs certain amounts of "Gas". The "Gas Cost" of executing code is closely tied to the real world cost of executing each type of instruction. The current "Gas Price" is set for each block in terms of Ether by the miner who mines the block. Accounts instigating transactions specify the gas price they are prepared to pay for their transaction and specify the maximum amount of gas a transaction can use known as "Start Gas". This commits an account holder to paying up to a certain amount of Ether for the transaction. Any unused gas is returned to the account holder at the end of the transaction. Miners reject transactions which run out of gas prior to completing execution.
In the Ethereum public network, "MainNet", all contract code and data are readable by any user of any node which connects to the network. Smart Contracts on Ethereum Main-Net can only perform permissioning in contract code, limiting which accounts can update the state of a contract. However, there is no mechanism to limit which users can read contract code and data.
The value proposition of Ethereum is that it allows untrusted parties to use Smart Contracts hosted on a public, distributed, highly available, secure platform.
B. Private Blockchains and Enterprise Ethereum
Private blockchains are blockchain networks which are established between nodes operated by enterprises [1] . Only permissioned nodes belonging to participating enterprises are allowed to join the private blockchain's peer-to-peer network and only permissioned accounts belonging to participating enterprises are allowed to submit transactions to the nodes. These blockchains provide the privacy and permissioning required by enterprises [12] .
The need for security and permissioning features over and above what is available in standard Ethereum [12] has led to a range of platforms being developed. J.P. Morgan developed Quorum [13] , a fork of the Golang Ethereum implementation called Geth [14] . ConsenSys's Protocol Engineering Group, PegaSys created Pantheon [11] , an Ethereum MainNet compatible client which aims to meet the permissioning and privacy requirements of the Enterprise Ethereum Client Specification [12] . Hyperledger Fabric [15] is a distributed ledger platform originally created by IBM and now hosted by The Linux Foundation. Similar to Quorum and Pantheon, the platform offers privacy and permissioning features. Whereas Quorum offers Ethereum based private transactions, Pantheon offers private smart contracts which are private to a set of participants. Hyperledger Fabric offers the ability to host one or more smart contracts on a private blockchain called a "channel". Hyperledger Fabric allows multiple channels to be operated on the one network, thus allowing for multiple sets of private contracts between different sets of participants to operate on the one network. An analysis of the merits of Hyperledger Fabric and Quorum can be found in Requirements for Ethereum Private Sidechains [1] .
C. Finality
A block is deemed final when it can no longer be changed. In some consensus algorithms, such as PoW, finality is probabilistic, where as more blocks are added to the end of the blockchain, older blocks are less likely to be reordered. Consensus algorithms such as Istanbul Fault Byzantine Tolerant (IBFT) [16] and Istanbul Fault Byzantine Tolerant version 2 (IBFT2) [17] give "instant" finality, where once a transaction has been included in a block minted by a validator, it can no longer be changed.
D. Distributed Systems and Databases
Gray [18] and Lampson and Sturgis [19] separately proposed two phase commit schemes which allow decentralised atomic updates. The first phase records a set of intentions which indicate the data updates to be applied. The end of this phase is to request the transaction be committed. The second phase actually performs the update. If the second phase did not complete then it is reapplied as many times as needed to complete the algorithm.
Reed [7] proposed a methodology for processing atomic actions on decentralized data when faced with system failures. A feature of this methodology is that if a communications failure causes the second phase of a two phase commit to not reach a node, then when the node needs to access the data, it contacts other nodes to determine if the second phase occurred and the data should be committed or not.
E. Threshold Signature Schemes
Threshold cryptography schemes [20] split secrets into Secret Shares. When a subset of participants cooperate they can reassemble the secret by combining their shares. In particular, any M shares of the N total shares can be used to recreate the secret. An attacker who has access to fewer than M shares is not able to determine any information about the secret.
In the context of Threshold Signature Schemes the private key is the secret which is split. Any M shares of the N total shares need to be used to generate a signature. The M shares can not be brought together to reassemble the private key, as this would reveal the private key. Instead, the M private key shares need to sign the data to be signed to generate M signature shares. These M signature shares are combined to create the threshold signature. The threshold signature can be verified using the public key which matches the private key which could be reassembled using the private key shares.
In a simple threshold signature scheme, the key shares are generated by a trusted party, called the dealer, then distributed to the participants. In a decentralised application, such a trusted setup is undesirable. An aggregated threshold scheme allows each participant to perform the operations of the dealer and create a set of key shares. These shares are then aggregated with the shares produced by the other participants to create the final key shares. This allows signing and verification to be done in a distributed fashion, without any trusted third party.
To ensure dealers are distributing correct values, the key generation scheme should be verifiable. In such a scheme, the final key shares are computed using an algorithm dependent on the private key shares of each participant. The Pederson commitment scheme [21] is an example of this form of verifiable secret sharing. The use of a verifiable generator proves that each participant is in possession of the private key share corresponding to its public share and makes it impossible for rogue participants to corrupt the process by submitting invalid shares.
Aggregation of keys and signatures is only possible in signature schemes with special mathematical properties. In particular, signatures based on elliptic curve pairing such as the Boneh-Lynn-Shacham scheme [22] , support aggregation due to the bilinear property of the pairing operation shown in Equation 1 .
e(k * P, Q) = e(P, k * Q)
This property allows signatures to be combined arithmetically, then verified by combining the corresponding public keys in a similar fashion. In blockchain applications, this allows all the signatures on all of the transactions in a block to be combined into a single signature which can be verified with the combined public key.
Another advantage of using a BLS-based signature scheme is that it allows use of the alt-bn128 curve [23] .This allows threshold signatures to be verified in the EVM as the EVM supports instructions to do this. The availability of EVM support makes on-chain operations significantly more efficient.
III. RELATED WORKS

A. Overview
Karynamoorthy et al. [24] identified that the two core problems for crosschain transactions to overcome are the communications between chains and the establishment of trust. The establishment of trust is a prerequisite for the communications. For an Ethereum context, the communications must provide Ethereum Transactions and Ethereum Views [8] . Ethereum Views involves executing a function which returns a value but does not update the blockchain state. This can be considered reading data between chains. Ethereum Transactions involve executing function calls which update the blockchain state, can transfer value, and can not return results. This can be considered writing between chains. Value transfer can be considered a separate type of communication to general transactions which allow arbitrary functions calls. Value transfer could involve transferring Ether, the underlying currency of Ethereum, or an ERC20 token [25] [26].
The literature review below provides a summary of the existing research into blockchain value transfer and function calls. A more detailed review can be found in our "Sidechains and Interoperability" paper [27] .
B. Value Transfer
Hashed Timelock Contracts [28] have been put forward as a mechanism for inter-chain value transfer. Smart Contracts are created on two separate blockchains, for instance Ethereum MainNet and a sidechain. A participant who wants Ether on the sidechain in exchange for Ether on Ethereum MainNet posts a message digest commitment to a secret to both contracts and puts in escrow the Ether in the contract on Ethereum MainNet. Another participant who wants to exchange Ether on Ethereum MainNet for Ether on the sidechain similarly puts Ether in escrow in the contract on the sidechain and posts a message digest commitment to a secret to both contracts. Both participants reveal their secrets and can then access their Ether. This allows trustless transfer of Ether between Ethereum MainNet and the sidechain. Given a fixed total quantity of Ether on the sidechain, this would allow for Mass Conservation between Ethereum MainNet and the sidechain, where no additional Ether is created or destroyed. Building on the concepts of Hashed Timelock Contracts, Thomas and Schwartz have proposed an Interledger Protocol [29] . Additionally, the Dogecoin to Ethereum bridge [30] uses this technology to allow for transfer of coins between Doge blockchain and Ethereum. A deficiency of Hashed Timelock Contracts is that the transfer can only be for the entire amount. There is no way to offer to exchange for only a part of the originally staked Ether.
Pegged Sidechains [31] proposes Bitcoins to be transferred between the Bitcoin blockchain and sidechains, to allow for increased transaction rate and experimentation. The solution relies on publishing proof that a transaction was included in a block and that further blocks were produced based on that block, in the source blockchain. If the hashing power of the source blockchain is significant, then it would be impossible for an attacker to produce forge blocks. The solution requires a 24 hour confirmation period to ensure enough blocks have been produced based on the block with the transfer to provide adequate security. Wood [32] argues that the sidechain hashing power is unlikely to be sufficient to ensure security, and as such Bitcoins can be securely transferred to the sidechain from the Bitcoin blockchain, but not back. In addition to this weakness, this proposal is not appropriate for enterprise solutions which require faster confirmation times than the 24 hours that this solution provides. Additionally, this solution is limited to value transfer and does not provide a general purpose solution.
Minimum Viable Plasma [33] builds on the concept of Plasma [34] 's delegate Ethereum blockchains. Plasma chain operators create a Plasma Smart Contract on Ethereum Main-Net and hold value deposited in the contract on a separate Plasma chain as Unspent Transaction Output (UTXO) [35] style values in a binary Merkle tree ordered by transaction index. Transactions on the Plasma chain involve proving that an unspent output had not previously been spent. Blocks on the Plasma chain are pinned to Ethereum MainNet. This methodology has proven to be unworkable in practice. The size of the proofs was too large and exiting the Plasma chain to recover funds on Ethereum MainNet involved doing a complex exit procedure which included a seven day challenge period.
Loom [36] have created a solution based on Plasma Cash [37] , which builds on the Minimum Viable Plasma approach. Rather than allowing arbitrary values, Plasma Cash only allows for the exchange of non-fungible assets. Each token has an identifier. The identifier represents the tokens location in a sparse Merkle Tree. To spend a block, proof needs to be submitted showing when the token has been used. This solution is specific to non-fungible assets, does not allow generic value transfer and cannot be extended to offer crosschain function calls.
Cross-chain communication in Metronome involves a twostep approach: obtaining a proof of exit Merkle receipt when removing tokens from the source chain and then presenting this receipt to the target blockchain to claim the MET tokens [27] , [38] , [39] . Metronome's design includes having autonomous smart contracts with ownership functions locked down after the launch [38] . Moreover, their cryptocurrency token MET is touted to be the first that is not permanently tied to any particular blockchain, and could be secured to another blockchain [38] . The system relies on trusted parties posting block hashes between blockchains and Merkle Proofs being submitted to prove events. The system is not appropriate for atomic crosschain function calls as it only allows value transfer, does not allow function calls, and is centralised.
The Token Atomic Swap Technology (TAST) research project proposes atomic cross-chain asset transfers with the requirement that these assets need to exist as tokens, such as ERC20 tokens on the blockchains, independent of the blockchain's native currency [27] . It implements a claim-first transaction as a manifestation of the proof of intent of the sender to make a cross-chain asset transfer. There are witness rewards for attesting to the transaction and an algorithm is provided for a cryptographically verifiable proof of intent [40] - [42] . In order to implement this cross-chain proposal all wallet balances have to be on all participating blockchains, and transferable assets need to exist as tokens on the blockchains [27] . The system is not appropriate for atomic crosschain function calls as it only allows value transfer, does not allow function calls, and allow balances need to be available on all blockchains.
C. Function Calls
Cosmos [43] proposes a multi-blockchain system in which there are blockchains called Zones exchange tokens via a central blockchain called a Hub. The Zones and the Hub use Tendermint [44] a type of Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance [45] [46] algorithm, rather than the Nakamoto Consensus [47] used by Bitcoin. The value transfer uses a similar approach to Pegged Sidechains, posting proofs that a transaction has been included in a block. Similar to the Pegged Sidechains proposal, the solution relies on the security of the Zones (in the Pegged Sidechains case, the sidechains).
Polkadot [32] proposes a multi-blockchain substrate upon which heterogeneous blockchains systems can communicate. Their system involves Relay Chains which forward messages between Para-Chains. Collators collect transactions on parachains and propose blocks. They submit these proposed blocks and zero knowledge non-interactive proofs proving the transactions result in valid state changes to Validators. Groups of Validators ratify Para-Chain blocks and publish them to the Para-Chain. The Validators seal the Para-Chain block headers to the Relay Chain. The Validators are randomly assigned to Para-Chains, with the assignment changing regularly. Validators use a Proof of Stake consensus algorithm. Nominators provide funds to Validators they trust to execute the Proof of Stake consensus. Fishermen observe the Para-Chains and submit fraud proofs to Validators.
Two forms of crosschain transactions exist in Polkadot: Cross-Para-Chain and Polkadot to and from external chains such as Ethereum [32] . With Cross-Para-Chain transactions, the transactions are identical to typical transaction from external accounts. The transactions are moved from the outward bound queue on one Para-Chain to the incoming queue on another Para-Chain. Transactions from Polkadot to Ethereum are achieved by submitting transactions to a special multisignature Ethereum contract. Transactions from Ethereum to Polkadot are achieved by calling into a special Ethereum contract which writes an event to the Ethereum event log. This event is interpreted as the outward bound call. The Polkadot system is complex because of its underlying requirement to allow heterogeneous blockchains. Routing Cross-Para-Chains transactions via the Relay Chain is likely to result in a bottleneck limiting performance. All Para-Chains use the consensus provided by the Relay Chain. As such, all Para-Chains use the same consensus algorithm.
Wang et. al. [48] proposed a blockchain router system for connecting heterogeneous blockchains via a routing blockchain, in a similar way to Polkadot and Cosmos. Multiple Connector components monitor each sub-chain for crosschain transactions, which they then submit to the router chain. The researchers suggested that the Connectors come to an agreement on the crosschain transactions, though how this agreement occurs is not described in the paper. Validator components mint blocks on the router blockchain using a PBFT consensus algorithm. Connectors take transactions from the router chain which are destined for their sub-chain and submit them to their sub-chain. There is no description of how the Connector to submit transactions to the sub-chain is chosen, or what is done to ensure valid transactions are submitted by the Connector to the sub-chain. The system is kept secure by fining malicious actors using a complex economic incentivisation scheme and components called Surveillants.
Kan et. al. [49] proposed a crosschain protocol for heterogeneous blockchains via a router blockchain as an intermediary between chains in a similar way to Cosmos and Polkadot. In this scheme a three phase commit is proposed. The system appears to rely on reliable communications to ensure the system does not result in one chain perceiving a transaction has succeeded and the other chain perceiving that the transaction has failed.
Cross-Shard Contract Yanking [50] [51] has been proposed as a method of crosschain function calls for Ethereum 2.0 shards [52] . In this technique, a special EVM instruction is used to move a contract and its state temporarily from a shard to the current shard. The action occurs updating the state. The updated state is then returned to the originating shard inside a receipt, possibly with a Merkle proof [53] proving that the state update was correct. Buterin [50] acknowledges that for this system to work, the contract needs to have small state and only be used by one entity. How the system responds to failures is not well defined. In particular, the case of the state being updated and the receipt being generated, but not being committed to the originating shard does not appear to be handled. From a confidentiality perspective, this approach is problematic. Users of the contract on the originating shard could be different to users on the current shard. The users on the current shard should not be able to see the state of the yanked contract. The contract may also contain information which reveals the membership of the originating shard, which is problematic from a privacy perspective.
A mechanism for cross-Hyperledger Fabric channel communications [54] has been proposed. The methodology is not documented, may not be secure, and does not appear to be supported by Hyperledger Fabric.
BTC Relay [55] is a method for allowing users of Ethereum to confirm Bitcoin transactions. Though not a method of executing function calls across chains, this technology is interesting as it allows actions to occur on one blockchain based on another blockchain. Relayers are compensated for posting Bitcoin block headers to a Smart Contract on Ethereum. Bitcoin transactions are confirmed by users submitting Merkle proofs showing that a transaction belonged to a certain block. BTC Relay relies on PoW mining difficulty for its security. Multiple active Relay nodes must be prepared to post the block header for each block. In this way, if one Relay node posts a block header of a fork of the chain, other Relay nodes can post the block header of the longest chain. Transactions can only be validated if the block header they relate to is on the longest chain and if at least six block headers have been posted on top of the block header that the transaction relates to [56] . As attackers can not produce a longer chain than the main Bitcoin blockchain due to the mining difficulty, they are unable to confirm transactions based on a malicious fork. PoW is not an appropriate consensus algorithm for private blockchains as organisations do not wish to allocate resources to mining of blocks [12] . Given the reliance of BTC relay on PoW mining difficulty, it is inappropriate for private blockchains.
The Clearmatics Ion project provides a framework and tools to develop crosschain smart contracts so that they execute automatically if a verifiable state transition has occurred on another database or blockchain [27] , [57] . This is known as 'continuous execution'. Example code to implement this functionality is available from the Ion GitHub repository [57] , [58] . The system works by having blocks posted from one chain to another by a party that asserts a state transition happened on one chain. The relevant transactions are then extracted and validated via the relevant Merkle Patricia trie hashes via contracts on the receiving chain. The initial set up is via a series of steps deploying contracts on the two systems to allow the two systems to become known to one another.
D. Blockchain Locking
The Cross-Shard Contract Yanking [50] [51] methodology described above can be viewed as providing a mechanism for locking a contract. As described above, this technique is not appropriate for consortium chains as the confidentiality of the shard data is not maintained.
Ethereum Researcher Max C [59] describes a two phase commit locking scheme. The scheme requires locks to be committed to shards on which data to be atomically updated resides, and Merkle Proofs proving the state update which includes the lock be submitted to the shard which will execute the transaction on the data. This system requires knowledge of the block hashes of the shards the data resides on, on the shard which will execute the transaction, to allow the Merkle Proofs to be verified. Block hashes of one sidechain will not be available on other sidechains in the proposed system. Additionally, there is the risk that publishing block hashes of a sidechain may reveal information about the sidechain, thus compromising the confidentiality of the other sidechain.
A method for resolving deadlocks in Cross-Shard Locking has been proposed [60] . This technique requires all crossshard transactions to have a start block number. When lock contention occurs, the cross-shard transaction with the earlier start block number gains the lock. The methodology does not handle the case when the two contending transactions have the same start block number. The idea of using block number as a proxy for time in contract locking will be used in this paper.
The Cross-Shard Contract Yanking proposal [50] allows contracts which include a move_to_shard(uint256 shard_id) function to be yanked between chains. Having this function is equivalent to indicating that the contract can be locked, and other contracts which do not contain this function are nonlockable. The concept of Lockable and Nonlockable contracts will be used in this paper.
E. Summary
Many of the existing solutions involve a single relay chain to transfer transactions between chains, which could become a bottle neck. This will limit the transaction rate of the crosschain communications technique. Most of the existing solutions do not protect the privacy of members of the communication blockchains. This means that the techniques are not appropriate for enterprise blockchain scenarios. Some of the existing techniques require all blockchains to have the same consensus algorithm. Allowing different consensus algorithms on different sidechains is likely to be advantageous. Some of the techniques require centralised trusted parties to ensure the operation of the system. Centralisation goes against the ethos of blockchain. None of the techniques offer atomic crosschain function calls, and hence do not offer the capabilities of the proposed Atomic Crosschain Transaction technology.
IV. APPROACH
This section describes the Atomic Crosschain Transaction protocol. It starts out by describing the protocol components used in the protocol. It then combines the protocol components and presents the overall approach. The section concludes with Crosschain Views, a special case in which all calls are Views and there are no transactions.
A. Protocol Components 1) Multichain Nodes: A Multichain Node is a grouping of one or more sidechain nodes, where each node is on a different sidechain. The sidechain nodes operate together to allow Crosschain Transactions and Views. The Multichain Node on which the transaction is submitted must have Validator Nodes on all of the sidechains on which the Originating Transaction and Subordinate Transactions and Views take place, plus have access to a Coordination Blockchain.
Coordination Blockchains are used to coordinate crosschain transactions. These blockchains could be Ethereum Private Sidechains, Ethereum MainNet, or a private blockchain. All nodes on all sidechains which will participate in a crosschain transaction need to be able to access the Coordination Blockchain.
Consider the example shown in Figure 2 . The application submits a transaction on Sidechain 1. This transaction causes an Ethereum View call on a contract on Sidechain 2 to execute, which results in other Ethereum View calls on Sidechain 3 and Sidechain 5. Additionally, as a result of the transaction on Sidechain 1, an Ethereum Transaction is submitted on Sidechain 4. This set of Ethereum Transactions and Ethereum Views is the result of a function call graph, in which a function on Sidechain 1 calls functions on Sidechain 2 to fetch a result, which in turn calls functions on Sidechain 3 and 5 to return results. The function on Sidechain 1 also calls a function on Sidechain 4.
Note that the result of submitting an Ethereum Transaction is to ask a blockchain to come to consensus on the result of the call. This differentiates blockchain activities from direct Figure 3 shows a set of enterprises which might take part in the call graph shown in Figure 2 . Enterprise A operates Multichain Node A which contains validator nodes on each of the sidechains which make up the call graph. Enterprises B and C operate Multichain Nodes which do not have nodes on all of the sidechains. Enterprise B needs to be certain that the Ethereum Transaction on Sidechain 1 is final, despite not being able to access Sidechain 4. Enterprise C needs to be certain of the results returned by View calls on Sidechain 3 and 5. Enterprise C needs to be certain that the Ethereum Transaction on Sidechain 4 is final despite not being able to access Sidechain 1.
The sidechain on which the application submits the Originating Transaction is called the Originating Sidechain. For example, in Figure 2 , it is Sidechain 1. The Originating Sidechain is transaction specific. It can be a different sidechain for each Crosschain Transaction.
The sidechain nodes which are part of the Multichain Node on which the Originating Transaction was submitted are called Coordinating Nodes. The Coordinating Node for each sidechain is responsible for ensuring communications between sidechains. Each enterprise could submit Crosschain Transactions to their own Multichain Nodes, thus changing which nodes are deemed to be Coordinating Nodes each transaction.
2) Sidechain Keys and Sidechain Threshold Signatures: Messages from one sidechain can be verified as originating from the sidechain by use of a threshold signature scheme. Each validator node on each sidechain has a Sidechain Private Key Share. Any M of the N sidechain validator nodes must collaborate to sign a message. The Sidechain Public Key can be used to verify the signature. The signature and the public key do not betray any information about which nodes signed, what the threshold number of validator nodes is (M) , or what the total number of validator nodes on the sidechain are (N).
Assuming that a sidechain is using a Byzantine Fault Tolerant consensus protocol that offers finality and can cope with up to F validators being malicious, off-line, or faulty, then the threshold M should be set to F+1. This is because considering that at most F validators are malicious, if F+1 validators agree on a given fact, for example that a transaction has been finalised, then this implies that at least one of these validators is honest and it sees the transaction as finalised in the sidechain. It should be noted that this threshold is less than the threshold required for consensus algorithms such as IBFT [16] and IBFT2 [17] which are tolerant of F faulty nodes if 2F+1 nodes are not faulty.
Threshold private key generation occurs when the sidechain is established. The Sidechain Public Key needs to be published to the Coordination Blockchain. Any sidechain node can access the Sidechain Public Key once it is available in the Coordination Blockchain. When a validator node is added or removed from the sidechain, a new key generation must occur and the new public key must be published to the Coordination Blockchain. Publishing to the Coordination Blockchain involves a voting process between participants of the sidechain. The evaluation of the votes needs to reflect the threshold M. The voting process should be shielded such that the membership of the sidechain are not revealed. Salted hash shielding, similar to what has been used for Anonymous State Pinning for Private Blockchains [5] [61] should be used.
3) Sidechain Identifier: Sidechain Identifiers are 256 bit values which identify a sidechain. They are used to identify which sidechain messages are intended for. They are also used to tie transactions to specific sidechains, to block replay attacks on other sidechains. Sidechain identifiers are randomly generated when the sidechain is first created as per the rules in Table I . The number range is chosen so as to not clash with the Chain Id values used in Ethereum so that these blockchains can be specified using a Sidechain Identifier. A sidechain keeps the same Sidechain Identifier even if nodes are added or removed from the sidechain. 6) Crosschain Transaction States: Figure 4 shows how a Crosschain Transaction transitions between states. The state is held in the Crosschain Coordination Contract. Most of the state changes relate to messages described in detail in Section IV-A12, Crosschain Threshold Messages.
4) Crosschain Transaction Identifier & Originating
Number Range
Description 0x00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000
Ethereum MainNet Chain Identifier to 0x00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,0000FFFF 0x00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,0000FFFF
Reserved for future use to 0xFEFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF 0xFF0000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000
Ethereum Private Sidechains to 0xFFFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF,FFFFFFFF Publishing the transaction start, commit or ignore state along with the time-out to the Coordinating Chain allows all sidechains to use this chain as a global time-out clock and global state store. Acting as a global time-out clock, it means that each chain does not have to rely on its local understanding of time for time-outs, which would lead to race conditions in which one sidechain might commit a state update and another sidechain might ignore a state update. Acting as a global holder of state ensures sidechains which receive Subordinate Transactions can be sure that the requested transaction and associated time-out was approved by all validators on the Originating Sidechain. 7) Contract Locking and Provisional State Updates: When a Coordinating Node on a sidechain receives an Originating Transaction, Subordinate Transaction or View which is part of a Crosschain Transaction, it checks whether the contract is locked. If the contract is locked, then the transaction or view fails. If the contract isn't locked, then the transaction or view can proceed. More complex behaviour is being considered for future work. However, to avoid complexities such as deadlocks, a simple fail if locked approach is appropriate for this initial protocol version. Figure 5 shows the locking state transitions for a contract. The Crosschain Coordination Contract will be in Started state. [62] , when the signature is calculated, the V value is combined with the Chain Identifier. As the Chain Identifier is included in the number range of the Sidechain Identifier, there is not need to combine the V value with the Chain Identifier. 9) Function Call Processing: When a node prepares to process an Originating Transaction, Subordinate Transaction or Subordinate View, it creates an ordered list of Subordinate Transactions and Subordinate Views it expects to execute. It uses these lists to ensure the code is executing as expected.
The high level code shown in Figure 1 is an abstraction of how Subordinate Transactions and Subordinate Views are called from within a function. Access to Subordinate Transactions and Subordinate Views is provided by precompiled contracts [8] , one for Subordinate Transactions and one for Subordinate Views. The high level code is preprocessed to translate it from the high level syntax to precompile calls.
When code is being processed, a call to a function in a contract on another sidechain results in one of the precompiles being executed. The precompile is passed the sidechain identifier of the sidechain the function should be executed on, the function identifier, and the parameters. The parameter values passed are the actual values that the EVM has for the variables at that point. The precompile compares actual values with the signed values for the next signed Subordinate Transaction or Subordinate View. The signed values are the values that the application expected to be passed in. If the actual values do not match the signed values of the next Subordinate Transaction or Subordinate View then the function call has failed. At this point, the entire Crosschain Transaction can be aborted.
10) Crosschain Transaction Generation: A Crosschain Transaction consists of the Originating Transaction and nested Subordinate Transactions and Subordinate Views. Each of these transactions and views contains signed parameters. These signed parameter values must match the actual values passed in via the EVM, as described in the previous section, Function Call Processing. Further, the Subordinate Transactions and Views must be put into the Originating Transaction in the order in which they will execute. A Dynamic Program Analysis approach is recommended for determining the order of Subordinate Transactions and Views and the parameter values. 11) Permissioning: Enterprises may wish to restrict which accounts can execute Subordinate Transactions or Views on sidechains. This permissioning extends the existing Account Permissioning of Enterprise Ethereum [12] to include permissioning for Subordinate Views. Allowing enterprises to restrict which accounts can submit Subordinate Views is appropriate as they must be executed across all validators on a sidechain, and hence incur expense for all validators.
12) Crosschain Threshold Messages: The Crosschain Transaction protocol relies on threshold signed messages to prove to other sidechains that a sidechain has come to consensus on some information. The messages are threshold signed by the validators on the sidechain that wishes to prove the information. The messages can be verified by using the Sidechain Public Key available in the Crosschain Coordination Contract. Table II lists the messages and their contents.
B. Subordinate View Processing
Subordinate Views can be submitted to a sidechain as a result of the Originating Transaction, Subordinate Transactions, or other Subordinate Views. This section presents how Subordinate Views should be processed.
In the sequence diagrams below 'Sidechain B' is the sidechain on which the Subordinate View is processed. This sidechain has been named to differentiate it from the sidechain submitting the Subordinate View.
The execution of Subordinate Views can be recursive. That is one Subordinate View can call another.
1) Subordinate View Processing: Coordinating Node: Together figures 6 and 7 show sequence diagrams for the processing a Subordinate View from the perspective of a Coordinating Node on a sidechain. It should be noted that these simplified diagrams do not include node failures, and local time-outs for threshold signing.
Subordinate View Process: Coordinating Node: Part 1, Figure 6 , describes the sequence of events for the Coordinating Node on a Sidechain B to determine whether the core view processing should be undertaken. Walking through the sequence diagram: It should be noted that these simplified diagrams do not account for node failures, requests to abort the Crosschain Transaction part way through the sequence, and do not include local time-outs set whilst waiting for the threshold signing process. In the diagrams, while the transaction is active, any action which results in Crosschain Transaction failed could then trigger the creation of a Crosschain Transaction Ignore message between the nodes on the Originating Sidechain and submission of that message to the Crosschain Coordination Contract.
Originating Transaction Process: Coordinating Node: Part 1, Figure 14 , describes the sequence of events for the Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain to determine if the Crosschain Transaction should be started. Walking through the sequence diagram: 2) Crosschain (Originating) Transaction Processing: Other Nodes: Together Figures 17 and 18 show sequence diagrams for the processing an Originating Transaction from the perspective of a node which is not the Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain. It should be noted that these simplified diagrams do not account for node failures.
Originating Transaction Processing: Other Node Perspective: Part 1, Figure 17 , shows the sequence diagram for first half of the processing of an Originating Transaction from the perspective of a node other than the Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain. Walking through the sequence diagram: Originating Transaction Processing: Other Node Perspective: Part 2, Figure 18 , shows the sequence diagram for the second half of the processing of an Originating Transaction from the perspective of a node other than the Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain. Walking through the sequence diagram: 
E. Crosschain View Processing
Crosschain Views are view calls which call across sidechains within a Multichain Node. Whereas Crosschain Transactions have at their top level an Originating Transaction, Crosschain Views have at their top level a view call. As the view calls only read state, no interaction with other nodes on any of the sidechains is required. As the value of results of each view call on each sidechain does not need to be proven to validators other than the Coordinating Node, the results do not need to be signed. As there are no updates, no contracts need to be locked. The Crosschain View Processing can occur synchronously.
As Crosschain View calls do not update state based on values read from the distributed ledger, there is flexibility with how locked contracts are treated. The Crosschain View calls can:
• Fail if any contract called is locked. • If any contract is locked, process the call assuming the lock fails. • If any contract is locked, process the call assuming the lock succeeds.
V. PROGRAMMING MODEL
This section provides some guidelines and considerations when designing applications which initiate Atomic Crosschain Transactions.
A. Transactions and Views
In the existing Ethereum programming model [63] , Ethereum Transactions are asynchronous [64] [65] [66] . They are executed some time after submission and execution may or may not occur. Additionally, Ethereum Transactions can not return a value. However, a transaction hash is returned to allow the status of the transaction to be tracked. The programming model required to support Crosschain Transactions is similarly asynchronous.
Ethereum Views currently execute synchronously. They execute immediately on the Ethereum node the request is submitted to on a local copy of the distributed ledger. Crosschain Views will similarly execute synchronously on the Multichain Node the request is submitted to on local copies of the distributed ledgers.
B. Designing Contracts for Locking
When a Crosschain Transaction fails because it is trying to lock a contract which is already locked, the contract is said to be in lock contention. To minimise lock contention, contracts should be designed to handle only small amounts of data. This is in contrast with the current trend to have large monolithic contracts which manage a lot of data. An example is shown in the Section V-D, Atomic Swap Ether Transfer Example, which explains this in detail.
C. Call Depth
This technology allows for arbitrarily deep call depths between sidechains. That is, there is no hard limit to the nesting of Subordinate Transactions and Subordinate Views below an Originating Transaction. The deeper the call depth due of a Crosschain Transaction, the more likely a call is to encounter a contract which is locked and fail. We are actively researching guidelines for call depth (see Section X, Future Work). While we are developing these guidelines, we suggest a call depth of two or three. That is, limiting Crosschain Transactions to an Originating Transaction calling a Subordinate Transaction or View, which calls a Subordinate Transaction or View. An important characteristic of the atomic swap technique described in the previous paragraph is that the second entity does not need to swap for all of the value which the first entity is offering. In previous techniques [28] the amount being swapped had to be the entire amount. Requiring the entire amount be swapped is a major limitation as this requires the exchanging entities to agree on the amount to be swapped out of band prior to executing the atomic swap on the blockchain.
D. Atomic Swap Ether Transfer Example
No entity can lock the contract thus blocking the registration of new atomic swaps because the Atomic Swap Registration Contract is an Nonlockable Contract. As the Atomic Swap Execution Contract is a Lockable Contract, entities can be sure that swaps will occur atomically. They can be sure that only one entity is able execute an atomic swap on the Atomic Swap Execution Contract at a time. However, many Atomic Swap Execution Contracts can be registered with the Atomic Swap Registration Contract, thus allowing a multitude of atomic swaps to occur simultaneously.
VI. FAILURE CASES HANDLED WITHIN PROTOCOL
This section describes how failures such as nodes going off-line or network connections breaking are handled by the protocol. In particular, all failures and potential failures described in this section are handled automatically by the protocol, and do not require application intervention.
A. Multichain Node not on all Sidechains
Situation: Multichain Nodes must have validator nodes on all sidechains which are called in the Crosschain Transaction. When the Originating Transaction is submitted to the Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain, the Coordinating Node has to assess whether it has all of the sidechains available given the Subordinate Transactions and Subordinate Views to be processed.
Issue: If a Coordinating Node does not think that the Multichain Node has access to all of the sidechains necessary to complete the Crosschain Transaction, then it should abort the Crosschain Transaction as soon as possible, to prevent resource wastage.
Action: Coordinating Nodes return an error to the caller if the tree of Subordinate Transactions and Subordinate Views contains a transaction or view which needs to be submitted to a sidechain which is not part of the Multichain Node.
B. Common Signer for Subordinate Views and Transactions
Situation: When a Coordination Node receives a tree of Subordinate Transactions and Subordinate Views, they may not all be signed by the same account.
Issue: Allowing Subordinate Transactions or Subordinate Views which were signed by accounts other than the one submitting the top level Transaction or signed View could possibly be used as some form of replay attack.
Action: An error is returned to the application.
C. Crosschain Transaction Replay
Situation: An attacker may have a copy of an old Crosschain Transaction. The transaction may have failed to be committed. The attacker should not be able to replay the transaction.
Issue: If a Crosschain Transaction could be replayed, attackers could attempt to attack the system with the replayed transaction.
Action: The transaction will be rejected by the Crosschain Coordination Contract when the Coordination Node on the Originating Sidechain submits the Crosschain Transaction Start message because an entry will already exist for the combination of Originating Sidechain Identifier and Crosschain Transaction Identifier on the Coordination Blockchain specified in the transaction.
D. Coordinating Node on the Originating Blockchain Failures
Situation 1: The Coordinating Node on the Originating Blockchain fails before the Crosschain Transaction Start message has been accepted by the Crosschain Coordination Contract.
Issue 1: The Crosschain Transaction will not start. Action 1: The Crosschain Transaction will not be committed.
Situation 2: The Coordinating Node on the Originating Blockchain fails at any point before the Crosschain Transaction Commit message has been accepted by the Crosschain Coordination Contract.
Issue 2: The Crosschain Transaction will time-out, and then be ignored.
Action 2: The Crosschain Transaction will not be committed.
Situation 3: The Coordinating Node on the Originating Blockchain fails after the Crosschain Transaction Commit message has been accepted by the Crosschain Coordination Contract, but before it has sent out the request for all nodes to look at the Crosschain Coordination Contract. Issue 3: Nodes will not know that the Crosschain Transaction has been committed.
Action 3: All of the nodes will have set-up a local timer which should expire when the Transaction Timeout Block Number is exceeded. Alternatively, they could wait until they need to access the contract state. Either way, they check the Crosschain Coordination Contract to see if the Crosschain Transaction should be committed or ignored.
E. Coordinating Node on a Sidechain Executing a Subordinate View or Transaction Fails
Situation 1: The Coordinating Node on a sidechain executing a Subordinate Transaction or View fails before the Subordinate Transaction or View has been submitted to the sidechain.
Issue 1: The Coordinating Node will not be available to process the Subordinate Transaction or View.
Action 1: The Coordinating Node on the sidechain which submitted the Subordinate Transaction or View will not be able to contact the Coordinating Node. If it is processing a Subordinate View, it will propagate an error to its caller. If it is processing a Subordinate Transaction, it will propagate an error to the Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain. The Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain will work with other nodes on the Originating Sidechain to sign a Crosschain Transaction Ignore message, and will submit it to the Crosschain Coordination Contract. The Crosschain Transaction will be ignored. 
F. General Node Failures
Situation: A node which isn't a Coordinating Node fails. Issue: If enough nodes fail, the sidechain will not be able to threshold sign messages.
Action: If any of the threshold signed messages can not be signed, the transaction will fail. If the Crosschain Transaction Ignore message can not be created, then the transaction will time-out. The Crosschain Transaction will be ignored.
G. Nodes Removed from a Sidechain
Situation: Nodes can be removed from sidechain due to voting or other sidechain specific mechanisms. If this occurs, then the node will no longer have permission to connect to other nodes on the sidechain.
Issues and Actions: This is an equivalent situation to a node failing. See Sections VI-D, VI-E, and VI-F for details.
H. Network Connection Failures
Situation: Network connections between nodes could fail. This is less likely to occur between nodes in a Multichain Node than for nodes in a sidechain, as nodes in a Multichain Node are likely to be co-located and nodes in a sidechain are likely to be widely dispersed.
Issues and Actions: Network failure scenarios will be similar to a node failing. See Sections VI-D, VI-E, and VI-F for details.
I. Attacker Compromises Nodes
Situation: An attacker could fully compromise a node. They could execute arbitrary code on the node. Issue 1: The attacker could try to create Crosschain Transaction Start messages with long time-outs, hoping to lock contracts for long periods. They could try to create Subordinate View Result messages with incorrect results. They could try to create Crosschain Transaction Commit messages to attempt to commit failed Crosschain Transactions. Action 1: Nodes will not threshold sign messages which they do not agree with. The resulting action will be for the Crosschain Transaction to fail.
Issue 2: If the attacker was a Coordinating Node they could hold a Subordinate Transaction. If the application resubmits the transaction (see Section VII-B, Resubmitting Failed Crosschain Transactions) prior to the original transaction timingout, the attacker could release the Subordinate Transaction and have it mined ahead of the resubmitted Subordinate Transaction. The resubmitted Subordinate Transaction would fail as it would use a nonce value which matched the nonce value used by the released transaction. This could result in a scenario similar to Section VI-O, Livelock.
Action 2: The application should wait for the original Crosschain Transaction to time-out prior to submitting new transactions. The attacker behaviour could be detected. The compromised node could be removed from the sidechain while the owner of the Multichain Node containing the compromised node removed the attacker.
J. Threshold Signing Issues
Situation: Coordinating Nodes create messages which need to be threshold signed in various parts of the protocol. Not enough of the validators may cooperate to create the threshold signature. This could happen for several reasons including: some validators do not believe the message should be signed, some validators being offline or some validators are uncontactable. Validators will send error message to the Coordinating Node if they do not want to sign the message. The Coordinating Node sets a local timer to detect time-out conditions whilst waiting for partial signatures. Independent of the reason, the Coordinating Node will be left not able to complete the threshold signing of the message.
Issue: The issue depends on the message which can not be signed: 
K. Coordination Blockchain Congestion
Situation: The Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain submits an Ethereum Transaction to start, commit or ignore the Crosschain Transaction to the Crosschain Coordination Contract on the Coordination Blockchain. If there is a Denial of Service (DoS) attack on the blockchain nodes, or if the blockchain utilisation is very high, the transaction may not be accepted.
Issue: The issues are the same as is described in Section VI-J, Threshold Signing Issues.
Action: The actions are the same as is described in Section VI-J, Threshold Signing Issues.
L. Sidechain Public Key Issues
Situation: Threshold signed messages are generated by validator nodes on sidechains to prove values to entities not on the sidechain. The messages are verified using Sidechain Public Keys which can be obtained from the Coordination Blockchain. The signature on a message could fail to verify when a validator was added or removed from the sidechain, during the transition time when the public key was updated on the Coordination Blockchain.
Issue: Crosschain Transactions will fail if threshold signatures can not be verified.
Action: The validator nodes should continue to use old threshold private keys until the new public key is available on the Coordination Blockchain. The old public key should be available and able to be used for a short period after the new public key is published, to allow threshold messages which have been signed but not verified to be verified.
M. Adding Nodes to a Sidechain
Situation: When a new sidechain node joins the network, it will attempt to synchronise the blockchain. Action 2: There is no mitigation for this situation. It may be wise to periodically (or on another basis) create a new genesis block which integrates the current state of the distributed ledger for long-lived sidechains to limit the potential impact. This would be similar to W3C's Checkpoint Block [67] .
N. Crosschain Transaction with Existing Contracts
Situation: An existing blockchain system may receive an upgrade which enables Crosschain Transactions.
Issue: Contracts on the existing blockchain may not have been written to cater for Crosschain Transactions. In particular, the locking caused by a Crosschain Transaction may adversely affect the system.
Action: Contracts which have not been created with a Lockable flag can not be locked. As such, all contracts on the existing system would not be lockable. Attempting to perform a Crosschain Transaction involving these contracts would fail as the transaction would fail when it attempted to gain a lock on the contract.
O. Livelock
Situation: Suppose that the contracts in Listings 1 and 2 are deployed on Sidechains 1 and 2 respectively. They each execute two Crosschain Transactions, one calling a function in a contract on Sidechain 3 first and then a function in a contract on Sidechain 4, and the other in the opposite order. Issue: The sequence of events outlined above leads to a livelock situation where neither the transaction c1.foo() nor the transaction c2.bar() will ever be committed.
Action: There is no solution for the moment. However, it should be noted that the probability that none of the transactions will be committed decreases as time progresses.
P. Centralisation
Situation: It could be considered that this proposed approach is centralised due to the existence of concepts such as Originating Blockchain and Coordination Nodes.
Issue: Centralisation is against the ethos of blockchain. Action: The Crosschain Transaction system has per transaction centralisation. That is, there are single Coordinating Nodes per sidechain, and in particular there is a single Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain. If these nodes or the connections between them fail, the crosschain transaction fails. Despite these per transaction centralisation points, the overall system is decentralised. Any Multichain Node can instigate a crosschain transaction from any sidechain.
VII. FAILURE CASES HANDLED BY APPLICATION
This section explains how application design can help prevent failures such as a contract being continually locked. In particular, all failures and potential failures described in this section need to be handled by the application, because they are not automatically handled by the protocol.
A. Heavily Used Contracts Continually Being Locked
Situation: Contracts used by many entities could be continually locked.
Issue: Entities wishing to read data from the contract could not read data. The contract could become unusable.
Action: Follow the guidelines in Section V, Programming Model. 
B. Resubmitting Failed Crosschain Transactions
C. Scaling within a Sidechain
Situation: The threshold signature scheme used by this approach requires 2N messages to be passed between nodes on a sidechain for each threshold signed message. A Crosschain Transaction requires two threshold signed messages (Start and Commit or Ignore) plus one threshold signed message for each Subordinate Transaction and for each Subordinate View.
Issue: Ethereum Private Sidechains using the consensus algorithms in the IBFT family (e.g. Clique, IBFT, IBFT 2) will encounter practical limitations in the number of validators due to the amount of message traffic generated by the protocols. Additionally, sidechains using IBFT may also encounter security vulnerabilities when operating on partially synchronous networks [68] .
Action: Limit the number of nodes in a sidechain which is likely to be part of Crosschain Transactions. The research team plan to determine quantifiable limits as described in Section X, Future Work.
D. Coordination Blockchain Bottleneck
Situation: All Crosschain Transactions require two Ethereum Transactions to be submitted to the Coordination Blockchain; one to start the transaction and one to commit or ignore the transaction. If many sidechains use the one Coordination Blockchain, then it could become overwhelmed, and start and commit messages may not be able to be submitted when needed.
Issue: If a Coordinating Node on an Originating Sidechain can not successfully submit a Crosschain Transaction Start message then the Crosschain Transaction can not be started and will fail. If the Crosschain Transaction Commit message can not be successfully submitted, then a transaction which could have been committed will time-out and be ignored.
Action: A multitude of Coordination Blockchains could be used. These blockchains could in fact be Ethereum Private Sidechains. Different Coordination Blockchains could be used with each Crosschain Transaction. However, all nodes which will be involved in the transaction need to be able to access the Coordination Blockchain.
E. Coordination Blockchain Availability
Situation: When a new node joins a sidechain, it needs to access all Coordination Blockchains referenced in Originating and Subordinate Transactions to determine if the transactions in the blockchain should be committed or ignored.
Issue: This implies that Coordination Blockchains need to live for as long as the oldest sidechain which they are referenced in.
Action: Prior to archiving any Coordination Blockchain, audit all operational sidechains to ensure no transaction refers to the Coordination Blockchain. An alternative to this is from time to time create an authenticated snapshot of the blockchain state, which new nodes can use as a starting point for synchronising the blockchain. This would be similar to W3C's Checkpoint Block [67] .
F. Privacy of Transactions in Crosschain Coordination Contract
Situation: The Coordinating Node on the Originating Sidechain submits an Ethereum Transactions to start, commit and ignore Crosschain Transactions. These transactions include the Originating Sidechain Identifier. These transactions must be signed by an Ethereum Account on the Coordination Blockchain.
Issue: The rate of Crosschain Transactions originating from a particular sidechain for a particular enterprise is revealed on the Coordination Contract. The Ethereum Account on the Coordination Blockchain might be able to be linked to a specific enterprise. If this could be done, then the fact that a specific enterprise is a member of the sidechain would be revealed.
Action: There is no mitigation for this situation.
G. Adding and Removing Nodes from a Sidechain
Situation: The Crosschain Transaction System described in this paper relies on threshold signatures for proving values across sidechains, and threshold voting for updating Sidechain Public Keys in the Crosschain Coordination Contract.
Issue: Adding a validating node to a sidechain and not adjusting the threshold will make it easier for validators to collude to produce malicious threshold signed messages or change the Sidechain Public Key. Removing a validating node from a sidechain and not adjusting the threshold will make it harder and could make it impossible to sign messages.
Action: As validating nodes are added and removed from a sidechain, the threshold used for distributed key generation and for voting on Sidechain Public Keys needs to be adjusted. The threshold could be set to match the threshold of the consensus algorithm. In this way, if a block can be produced on a sidechain, then so too will a threshold signed message be able to be produced.
H. Trust Boundaries
Situation: On a single blockchain, the trust boundary is defined around the entire chain including all of its nodes, but excluding applications such as wallets that might connect to it. The trust boundary for a single chain is guaranteed by the nature of the chain itself and is therefore both implemented and maintained at a technical level. Crosschain transactions introduce an expansion of the trust boundary that must extend a priori to all other sidechains and coordination blockchains that are utilised by the Originating Sidechain.
Issue: The crosschain trust boundary cannot be defined statically because it may be extended at runtime by authors of smart contracts. The trust boundary also cannot be enforced technically. Therefore, crosschain trust boundaries must be both defined and managed socially, at a level above the sidechain itself.
Action: Originating Sidechain operators must choose to trust operators and implementations of all other sidechains and Coordination Blockchains that are utilised by the Originating Transaction, or restrict smart contracts from being able to access them via out of band mechanisms; for example white or black network connection lists or firewall rules. Setting only selected smart contracts as Lockable will act to reduce the Trust Boundary.
I. Byzantine Coordination Blockchains
Situation: Byzantine Coordination Blockchains could negatively impact state on Originating Sidechains by selectively answering checks from other validator nodes on whether Crosschain Transactions have been committed.
Issue: Such behaviour could result in forking validators on Originating Sidechains, and could conceivably place them in states from which they cannot recover the correct state of their blockchain.
Action: The actions are the same as is described in Section VII-H, Trust Boundaries.
J. Liveness Issue 1
Situation: The overall combined minimum network latency is greater than the time-out specified by the Transaction Timeout Block Number.
Issue: The Crosschain Transaction cannot be executed as the transaction will always time-out. The block number on the Coordination Blockchain will always be greater than the Transaction Timeout Block Number before a Crosschain Transaction Commit message can be submitted to the Coordination Blockchain.
Action: The Application should submit a new Crosschain Transaction with a longer timeout. Note that the guidelines in Section VII-B, Resubmitting Failed Crosschain Transactions should be taken into consideration prior to submitting the new transaction.
K. Liveness Issue 2
Situation: The minimum network latency is higher than the largest Crosschain Transaction Time-out the Crosschain Coordination Contract is configured to allow.
Action: Use a Crosschain Coordination Contract which is configured to allow larger Crosschain Transaction Time-outs.
L. DoS using Subordinate Reads
Situation: Imagine there were three sidechains A, B, and C, that Enterprise A has a Multichain Node on all three sidechains, and Enterprise B has a Multichain Node on sidechains B and C. Further imagine that there is a time sensitive bidding process on sidechain C which Enterprise A and B are competing on. To lodge a bid, Enterprise A must do a Crosschain Transaction involving sidechains A and C, and Enterprise B must do a Crosschain Transaction involving B and C. Enterprise A might be able to execute many legitimate Crosschain Transactions which execute Subordinate Views on sidechain B.
Issue: Enterprise A might be able to overload the computing resources for sidechain B, thus blocking Enterprise B's ability to submit a bid.
VIII. APPLYING TECHNOLOGY TO OTHER BLOCKCHAINS
A. Private Blockchains
The atomic crosschain transaction technology described in this paper could be applied to a wide variety of private blockchain and distributed ledger systems including Hyperledger Fabric [69] [70] , Corda [71] and Quorum [13] [72] [73] . To operate as a sidechain within a Multichain Node, using an Ethereum blockchain for the Coordination Blockchain, the platforms would need to offer the following features:
• Validators: A set of validators which can attests to the state of the blockchain. • Threshold signature scheme and associated distributed key generation and messaging: This is required so that the blockchain can generate crosschain messages such as the Subordinate View Result message. • Finality: The consensus algorithm used on the blockchain must be able to determine when a block is final. This is required because crosschain messages such as the Crosschain Transaction Ready and the Crosschain Transaction Commit messages can not be issued until the Subordinate and Originating Transactions they relate to are final. • Contract locking and unlocking mechanisms: This is required so that transactions across blockchains will be atomic. • Subordinate View / Transaction Execution: A platform specific method for indicating a Subordinate Transaction or View should be executed within the contract code. In Ethereum platforms this takes the form of a precompile. • RLP encoded function calls: The encoding format for crosschain transactions is RLP encoding. As such, function call parameter values need to be translated to and from the native blockchain format to RLP encoded values. • JSON RPC cc_SendRawCrosschainTransaction API method: This is the API called by other blockchains to execute Subordinate Views and Subordinate Transactions.
B. Public Blockchains
The underlying assumption of the crosschain transaction technology is that all participants are known and wish to maintain their reputation. It is assumed that the consequences for acting inappropriately occur outside of the blockchain. Having this assumption allows a set of validators to threshold sign a message which attests to the state of the blockchain. If a permissionless blockchain system could meet this assumption, then they too could support this technology.
IX. CONCLUSION
We introduced a methodology for Atomic Crosschain Transactions across private sidechains and blockchains. Using the techniques described in this paper, a function in a contract on one sidechain could call functions in contracts on other sidechains. This capability allows functionality or data available in one sidechain to be used by other sidechains, which opens up a swathe of new opportunities within the blockchain ecosystem. The onus rests on the application designers and developers to adhere to the programming model and guidelines to fully harness this powerful technology, and in the spirit of the open source community contribute to extending this functionality to make it even more robust and flexible. This technology has been described in terms of Ethereum Private Sidechains. However, it could be used with any contract based private blockchain system which incorporates the requisite features. In particular, the ideas in this paper could facilitate an inter-ledger protocol which would allow disparate blockchain technologies to interoperate.
X. FUTURE WORK
The following areas are being actively pursued as part of the Crosschain Transactions work.
• Theoretical and practical performance analysis. In particular, to determine the performance of Crosschain Transactions as the number of nodes in a sidechain grows and the Subordinate Transaction and View depth grows. • Investigate more complex locking mechanisms and the potential to invoke different types, or levels, of locking depending on the call graph and complexity of the Crosschain Transactions. 
